Sophie's sense of deep connection with the Catalan language is explained in very Herderian terms: it 'emanates from the depths of time, and is the eternal collective mother' (Cussà, 2010: 48, 78).[20] On the other hand, a man of Gypsy origin proudly states that no other country has ever treated Gypsies as well as the new Catalonia, while a contrast is made in another case between two men who are putting forward different points of view at the celebrations of the twentieth anniversary of independence: one of them is demanding a federation of Catalan states in a Catalan thick with Castilian influences, while the other holds a placard proclaiming (in Spanish) 'Long Live Spain!' but speaks grammatically perfect Catalan (Cussà, 2010: 54). The diverse nature of the new state is stressed through further references to people of African, Latin American, European and Asian origin who are now 'absolutely committed to the sentiments and referents of the State of Catalonia' (Cussà, 2010: 51).[21]

These novels all take their cue from contemporary debates and concerns, but add an extra creative dimension that feeds the reader's imagination. They remind us of the fundamental role played in nationalism by collective dreams of a better world: a new 'golden age' to come. However, encouraging members of a stateless nation to make such dreams a reality implies much more than the rehearsal of rational arguments about the risks and potential rewards of secession for the individual, since these cannot speak directly to 'the strong emotional dimension of belonging which involves commitment and identification with the group' (Guibernau, 2013: 6). Literature – on the other hand – can do so, and moreover it tends to elicit emotional responses based primarily on empathy rather than egoism (Hogan, 2011: 22–3, 68). It therefore speaks to the reader first and foremost of that which unites him/her with the protagonist(s). Even *Crònica de la independència*, which is the novel that least directly appeals to collective sentiment, can engage the readers' empathy with the cast of characters it presents: imagined future members of their own renewed nation. If emotion is 'experienced as transformation of dispositions to act' (Barbalet, 2001: 27), then the kind of empathic emotion stimulated by these novels has the potential to arouse the same transformation as the affective priming used in the audio-visual products examined in the previous chapter. Gabancho dedicates *Crònica* 'to those who make dreams into reality' (Gabancho, 2009: 13):[22] as readers we are perhaps meant to know that she hopes that includes us.

Conclusion

There are two interweaving currents in the political discourses and cultural phenomena that have been analysed in this volume. On one hand, we see the evolving construction of a simplified message about independence designed to generate consensus; on the other, the realities of the fragmentation, ambivalence, and social complexity that belie this simplification. Nevertheless, as time goes on the idea that the secessionist message is a self-evident truth becomes ever stronger, as pro-independence social actors increasingly refine their ability to construct meaning (Castells, 2009: 10). The only discourse of equivalent strength is that of Spanish unionism, which – especially in its right-wing form – is easily rejected, not just by those who support independence but by a wide spectrum of Catalans who object to the way it attempts to mark them as 'bad' Spaniards. 'Collective dignity and self-respect' and 'expectations of mutual reciprocity (vis-à-vis the majority group)' are fatally undermined by Spanish nationalists' attacks on the Catalans' public image and key national symbols (Lluch, 2012: 440).

The effect of the increasing polarisation of these two discourses can be seen in the fact that, by the end of 2013, two apparently contradictory trends were emerging in Catalan politics. The political landscape seemed to have taken a new turn, with ERC now close to – or even ahead of – CiU in surveys of voting intentions (Noguer, 2013a; Sastre, 2013). The surveys suggested ERC would gain a similar number of seats to those that would be lost by CiU. This would appear to indicate that Mas had not been able convincingly to play the role of separatist leader and that voters with a strong commitment to independence were therefore switching to ERC. As *El País* put it,

> The leaders of CiU have been discreetly warning of this for months: 'If Rajoy won't negotiate with Mas, one day he will have to do so with Junqueras in even more complicated circumstances'.[1] (Noguer, 2013a)

The surveys also indicated an increasing polarisation of Catalan voters, with the 'anti-nationalist' *Ciutadans* set to win more seats, possibly even becoming the third force in the parliament (Noguer, 2013a). The overall

picture, then, was one of fragmentation of the pro-independence vote and a widening division between the pro- and anti-independence camps.

On the other hand, one of the same surveys also showed that, given the choice, the majority of Catalans would vote neither for independence nor the status quo, but a 'third way' between the two (Noguer, 2013b). While 46% would choose independence in a straight yes/no vote, the figure would drop to 31% if also offered an alternative that would exclusively give Catalonia more powers within the Spanish state: in fact, 40% of voters would choose this other option. The proposed referendum question drafted in December 2013 by a joint working party of CDC, UDC, ERC, ICV, CUP and EUiA[2] did indeed include this 'third way' as an option, although more because of the need to find a consensus among these parties to take the referendum forward than as a reflection of the will of the people. The question had two parts: 'Do you want Catalonia to become a state? If so, do you want that state to be independent?'.[3] This would give voters three options, since a 'no' vote to the first question would indicate an acceptance of the status quo, 'yes' to both parts would be a vote in favour of independence, and 'yes' then 'no' would indicate a wish to find some other way forward, such as a federal or confederal solution. However, at the time the question was devised there was no party able properly to represent this last viewpoint in the Catalan parliament, and no clarity about what a 'third way' might involve. The very term 'third way' marks this 'other' option as somehow radical or deviant.

This suggests that the secessionist message made hegemonic through the efforts of political and civil pro-independence forces may appear to be working to unite a greater number of Catalans behind the option of independence, but their true desires are more ambivalent. This is unsurprising given that remaining part of Spain was the clear majority position in Catalonia only a decade ago. Furthermore, Henry E. Hale argues that it is natural for all 'Regions' to prefer to remain within the central state, although only if that does not adversely affect the life-chances of their residents (Hale, 2008: 70). Jaime Lluch expresses the same idea slightly differently when he characterises sub-state nationalists as belonging to a 'moral polity' whose continued desire to remain within the state depends on 'plurinational reciprocity' (Lluch, 2012: 456). The lack of willingness by the Spanish government to provide such reciprocity is one of the main explanations for the lack of representation of a credible 'third way' within the Catalan party structure.

These kinds of survey results are seized upon by opponents of Catalan independence to discredit the idea that the majority of Catalans support secession. Indeed a counter-discourse is emerging that speaks of a silent –

or 'silenced' – majority in Catalonia whose views are marginalised by the polarised terms of the current debate. Thomas Jeffrey Miley describes this as an issue of 'blocked articulation' affecting certain sections of the Catalan electorate – 'particularly, working-class Castilian-speakers' – on all matters dealt with by the Catalan parliament, not just independence (Miley, 2013a: 13–14; Miley, 2013b). The present study has only considered the evolution of pro-independence arguments and sentiment, and not the arguments of dissenting groups, and so it would be inadvisable to draw conclusions here about the existence or characteristics of this silent/silenced majority/ minority. However, Miley's identification of working-class Spanish speakers as the main under-represented constituency does feed in to the debate on the role of ethnicity in the Catalan secession movement, and it is this subject to which we now turn in conclusion.

Uncertainty Reduction and Risk Evaluation: Ethnicity and its Alternatives

This book has suggested that there is much to be gained by viewing Catalan nationalism as inherently ambivalent about its ethnic foundations, as suggested by Steven Mock. Furthermore, ethnicity does not work well for Catalans as an uncertainty-reducing mechanism, partly because Catalanist rhetoric explicitly rejects ethnicity as a resource for constructing national identity, and partly because Catalan ethnicity is itself uncertain. Nevertheless, we have seen from both political rhetoric and cultural phenomena how other elements have come to substitute for ethnicity in the national imagination. When Thomas Hylland Eriksen suggested that ethnicity can have 'functional equivalents' he put particular emphasis on place and kinship (Eriksen, 2004), and these do indeed seem to be key to contemporary notions of Catalonia as a 'state in waiting'.

Although a shared sense of place would appear to demand very specific referents, it is actually the more intangible of the two notions. As I suggested in the Introduction, the idea that Catalonia's territorial borders might substitute for ethnic ones is problematic because of the unresolved issue of how independence for the current Autonomous Community of Catalonia would affect its political and cultural relationship with the other Catalan-speaking areas of Spain and France. However, this does not prevent place being used metonymically or synechdochically to signify a community that retains a sense of territory through an emotional connection rather than political borders. As Eriksen points out, 'territoriality is metaphorical

since the nation is an abstract place' (Eriksen, 2004: 55). This is clear from some of the cultural products we have analysed. *Adéu, Espanya?* and *Hola, Europa!* use landscapes and cityscapes to stimulate a particular affective response in their viewers based on their positive feelings towards these places. Novels such as *Victus, Lliures o morts* and *Tres en ratlla* describe historically and politically significant locations that speak to their readers as Catalan citizens as well as members of the nation. On the other hand, *A reveure, Espanya,* set in the Catalan countryside, describes a traditional country property (*mas*) as a site of political action that affects the whole nation, perhaps hinting at a more primordial connection of Catalan identity with the countryside rather than the city.

Nevertheless 'fictive kinship' appears to be more important than place as a substitute for ethnicity in Catalonia's national mythscape (Eriksen, 2004: 59). In fact, Martha Nussbaum subsumes place under kinship when she comments that

> patriotic love is particularistic. It is modelled on family or personal love of some type, and, in keeping with that origin or analogy, it focuses on specifics: this or that beautiful geographical feature, this or that historical event. (Nussbaum, 2013: 208–9)

'Family or personal love' is a key feature of both the political discourse surrounding independence – in which love of family becomes a positive motive for supporting secession – and explorations of the nature of the nation in cultural products. It is explicitly portrayed in *Victus, Lliures o morts, Tres en ratlla* and *A reveure, Espanya* as the basic building block that underpins love of community. Nor is this love exclusive, as is best exemplified by Martí Zuviría's unusual adopted family.[4] Rather, family and community are defined by the act of loving itself, which focuses not just on the large-scale 'specifics' noted by Nussbaum, but also on the shared trivia of everyday existence, which denote 'being in the same boat and living in the same world' (Eriksen, 2004: 57; see also Vázquez, 2013: 20–2). *Polònia*, for example, reminds Catalans of how much they have in common in their daily experience despite their heterogeneous cultural heritage.

Eriksen points out that it is this kind of everyday interaction over long periods of time that engenders a sense of trust (Eriksen, 2004: 56). As we have noted, trust in political institutions is at a very low ebb at the moment, not just in Catalonia but Spain as a whole (Vázquez, 2011). Indeed, Catalan calls for independence are partly inspired by a desire for a more trustworthy democracy. Marc Moreno portrays some of the reasons for this lack of trust in *Independència d'interessos*, while Patrícia Gabancho tries to get round the

problems it causes by bringing back a more trusted figure from the past – Miquel Roca – as the protagonist of the drive for independence in her 'journalistic fiction'. Meanwhile, *Victus* specifically points the finger at the political classes' ineptitude, crediting the Catalan public with the steadfastness and determination they lack, while *Tres en ratlla* tries to reconcile the two by describing a 'pincer movement' of institutional and civil action for independence. Despite the rhetoric of popular revolt, the use of a unilateral declaration of independence in all three of the 'imagined futures' we examined in chapter 6 suggests that an institutionally-driven bid for secession is considered the only practical way forward, however much this might be driven by 'bottom up' pressure. The sub-text here, then, is that Catalonia's leaders can be trusted to do the right thing in the end, no matter if there are – as most blatantly in *A reveure, Espanya* – some dubious machinations along the way.

J. M. Barbalet draws a distinction between trust, which 'gets by with inconclusive evidence', and confidence, 'which requires substantial evidence' (Barbalet, 2001: 83). He posits that action is more likely to occur when it has a basis in confidence, rather than simply trust, because 'confidence, in bringing a possible future into the present, provides a sense of certainty to what is essentially unknowable, so that assured action with regard to it may be engaged' (Barbalet, 2001: 88). Barbalet argues that confidence is therefore 'a central affect or emotion for praxis' (ibid.), which implies that the stimulation of this emotion ought to be a central concern for those who would like to mobilise the public behind a bid for independence. Indeed, we have seen this at work in such things as the construction of narratives of 'ordinary' heroism, the refutation of 'discourses of fear', and the portrayal of better futures, all of which engage emotional as well as rational means of boosting confidence in civil solidarity and political leadership. They also point to an underlying preoccupation with achieving a 'tipping point', at which the choice to support independence can be made with the confidence of knowing that it is the most likely preference of other members of the community (Laitin, 2007: 58). Confidence-boosting activities linked to the assurances offered by kinship therefore reduce uncertainty in a similar way to the 'rule of thumb' provided by ethnicity (Hale, 2008: 48).

In the case of Catalonia, the sense of kinship that substitutes for ethnicity is very broadly defined. In fact, it would be so broad as to be meaningless if it was not for the simultaneous maintenance of ingroup/outgroup boundaries, and it is perhaps here where we most obviously see the ambivalence of which Steven J. Mock speaks. Socio-political imperatives in today's Catalonia demand 'a radical inauthenticity' in nationalist thinking (Mock,

2012: 44): the construction of the ingroup as a matter of purely voluntary belonging. Although kinship and place can substitute for ethnicity in this process, these are harder to press into service in definitions of the outgroup: if anyone can be 'kin', how can we identify with certainty those who are not? Definitions of the outgroup are therefore based primarily on the more automatic shorthand offered by ethnic categorisation. Thus 'Spain', and by extension 'Spaniards', are characterised as (by nature) politically incompetent, inefficient, centralising, inward-looking, domineering and disrespectful (for examples, see Castro, 2013: passim). These stereotypes draw on a long tradition of differentiation of the Catalan and Spanish (or Castilian) character, and are used in current circumstances to suggest that the Spanish state is innately exploitative. It is here that we most obviously see the continued relevance of ethnicity: not as an uncertainty-reducing mechanism, but as a 'means by which people turn uncertainty into risk', leading them to stress 'the dangers of exploitation in a union seen to be dominated by members of other ethnic communities' (Hale, 2008: 79).

The difficulty with this method of separating ingroup and outgroup is that there are residents of Catalonia who could on this basis be characterised as part of the Spanish outgroup (because they have roots in the rest of Spain and have not taken on important signs of Catalan identity such as preferring to speak Catalan). However, those who have not visibly joined the Catalan ingroup are not immediately characterised as members of the outgroup. Rather they are seen as members of the ingroup who need to be persuaded to act as such. As Reicher and Hopkins suggest, in the construction of social identity 'the process of consensualization and the state of dissensus are entirely compatible – more than that, they are interdependent [. . .]: we only bother arguing because we expect to agree' (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001: 102). It is therefore perfectly possible for dissenters to remain part of the ingroup. Nevertheless, as we saw in *Tres en ratlla*, it can still be tempting to categorise those who refuse to be persuaded as ethnically incapable of seeing the benefits of independence.

Emotion, Loyalty and Identification

The preceding discussion suggests that emotions such as confidence, trust, pride, attachment to place and love of kin combine to produce an overarching national sentiment that now has a renewed importance for those who identify as Catalan. Indeed, Montserrat Guibernau argues that identification has a stronger emotional component than an inherited identity. This is because of the element of personal choice, which binds us more closely to the community with which we wish to identify (Guibernau, 2013: 3, 6). Political mobilisation to protect that community is therefore just as likely to occur even though, to an observer, the objective ties may appear weak (Guibernau, 2013: 92). Similarly, Sara Ahmed describes identification not as a result of love for a particular object but as 'a form of love' in itself: 'it is an active kind of loving', which results in a transformation of ourselves (Ahmed, 2004: 126). Silvina Vázquez uses similar terms when speaking specifically of the way Catalans talk about their nation: 'through the bonds of identification, that which has been adopted *by* the person *becomes* the person' (Vázquez, 2013: 21).[5] No wonder, then, it is so deeply wounding to be accused of hiding purely selfish motives behind love for one's nation.

Mock suggests that a necessary first step in solving ethnic conflicts is to stop trying to discredit nationalists' claims about the historical legitimacy of their nation – since this will not change their minds in any case – and instead properly acknowledge the validity and depth of their national sentiment (Mock, 2012: 281–2). It could certainly be argued that if the Spanish governments of the 1970s and 80s had recognised that Catalan nationalism was as much about sentiment as politics, relatively minor concessions could have been made that would have averted – or at least diminished – the current secession crisis, even if some of the short-term circumstances after 2005 (e.g. the economic crisis) had been much the same. Instead, the 'solution' revolved around a form of legal and administrative autonomy that gave Catalonia more tools to construct itself as 'different' (the most significant of these being its quasi-parallel media networks and its competencies in linguistic, educational and cultural policy), without at the same time reinforcing the reasons why Catalans might wish to identify with Spain (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007: 160). If, as Guibernau suggests, the devotion triggered by voluntary – or 'democratic' – loyalty is potentially stronger than that which comes with loyalty to an inherited identity, then the inherited dual Spanish and Catalan identity of the majority of Catalans is not enough in itself to prevent shifts in the balance of these allegiances over time (Guibernau, 2013: 137).

This, it seems, is where the role of the pro-independence sector of Catalonia's cultural and intellectual elites, and the communication power they enjoy, has the most influence. Firstly, they are able to remind Catalans that identifying with Catalonia is a form of 'democratic loyalty', partly by stressing the active role of 'the people' throughout Catalonia's history, but also by constructing Spanish nationalism as a form of 'authoritarian loyalty' which involves 'reverence for a particular narrative, the preservation of the status quo and the defence of traditionalism' (Guibernau, 2013: 137). Secondly, they are able effectively to stimulate the emotional components

of this loyalty in a way that politicians find more difficult because of general cynicism about their trustworthiness. As we have seen, heightened emotional states have consequences for decision-making, acceptance of new information and arguments, and the likelihood (or otherwise) of active participation. The multi-dimensionality of the networks in which the cultural elites move, and the multimodality of the communication system they employ, extend the reach of their influence and help them to intersect with expressions of civic activism that draw on contemporary and traditional popular culture. Together, they help turn separatist politics into emotive spectacle.

Clearly, what has been described in this book is an evolving situation that has the potential to take a number of different turns, as long-standing and transient factors continue to interweave. Whatever happens, Catalonia will remain an important object of study for our understanding of nationalism and secession movements in democratic nation-states, and maybe even as an example of the creation of a new European state. Further research is needed especially in the area of Catalonia's civil pro-independence movement and its use of the internet and social media. Any study of this or other developments that includes the analysis of cultural products can only function as a complement to other approaches grounded in more scientific methodologies. Nevertheless, culture and communication are key components of the current situation and it has been my aim here to make sure that their importance is not overlooked – not least because they remind us of the emotional impact of this political conflict and its direct personal relevance to millions of individuals.

Notes

Introduction

1 'Si un objectiu prioritari ha de tenir un govern català és la defensa, l'enfortiment i la projecció d'allò que fa que, a través dels segles, Catalunya hagi estat Catalunya: la seva llengua, la seva cultura, la vivència de la seva història, el sentiment i la consciència de col·lectivitat, la defensa dels seus drets polítics, la voluntat de ser . . . '.

2 'la butxaca i el cap, és a dir, el desig de viure millor'.

3 'inespecífic però molt sentit'.

4 Compare, for example, the 34% of respondents cited as describing Catalonia as a nation in 1996 (McRoberts, 2001: 164, 168) with the 51% in 2005 (*El Periódico*, 9 October 2005, p. 2; survey conducted by GESOP).

5 Hale points out that the unconscious nature of ethnic categorisation means that any of us can occasionally lapse into racial stereotyping despite all our efforts not to do so (Hale, 2008: 48).

I Political Parties and Civil Pro-Independence Groups

1 What Scotland Thinks, 'Do you agree that Scotland should be an independent country?', http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/should-scotland-be-an-independent-country-1#table, accessed 5 August 2013.

2 'A bird in the hand'. (The phrase literally means 'fish in the basket'.)

3 'el federalismo debe ser el modelo definitivo de nuestra organización territorial'.

4 'Espanya com a *nació política*'; 'una demanda de major reconeixement'.

5 Figures taken from http://3anys.ara.cat, accessed 29 November 2013.

6 'ARA vol contribuir al debat, parlant de tot sense dogmes i sense límits, perquè Catalunya aposti pel futur amb tota la seva ambició i energia, i esdevingui aviat una de les societats europees amb més prosperitat i benestar, capaç de generar riquesa immaterial i material per als seus ciutadans, de manera permanent i sostenible.' From ARA's Founding Manifesto, available on http://arames.ara.cat/manifest/, accessed 29 November 2013.

7 'Manifestació 2.0'.

8 'la plena recuperació col·lectiva de la identitat de la nació catalana' (Article 2).

9 'Aquesta sentència confirma que la llengua catalana no pot disposar d'un marc jurídic propi i tanca la via a la igualtat de drets lingüístics a Espanya. A partir d'ara, per garantir aquests drets cal plantejar un canvi de marc legal de fons –ja sigui mitjançant una reforma de la Constitució Espanyola o per la creació d'un